US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0147/01478.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH01478}
$Pretitle{128}
$Title{The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Chapter 22A  After the Fall of Saipan:  Tinian & Guam}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Dyer, VAdm. George C.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{guam
assault
admiral
japanese
troops
general
saipan
division
amphibious
july}
$Volume{Vol. 2}
$Date{1973}
$Log{}
Book:        The Amphibians Came to Conquer:  Volume 2
Author:      Dyer, VAdm. George C.
Affiliation: USN
Volume:      Vol. 2
Date:        1973

Chapter 22A  After the Fall of Saipan:  Tinian & Guam

     Before dropping the Saipan Operation and moving on to the amphibious
assaults against Guam and Tinian, it is necessary to touch on Vice Admiral
Turner's part in the forced detachment of Major General Ralph C. Smith from
his command of the 27th Infantry Division, some of the background thereof, and
the subsequent furor.

Prelude

     The 27th Infantry Division was one of the five infantry divisions in Task
Force 56, the Expeditionary Troops.  Initially, the 27th had constituted the
Floating Reserve for the Saipan assault.  Ordered to land on 16 June, the 27th
participated in the fighting, commencing 17 June 1944.

     When mustered into federal service in October 1940, the 27th Infantry
Division was a unit of the National Guard of the state of New York.  In
1943-1944, its three infantry regiments were the 105th, 106th, and 165th.  The
165th Regiment had evolved out of the old 69th Regiment, New York Infantry,
the Fighting Irish of World War I fame.  It, along with one battalion of the
105th, fought at Makin.  Two battalions of the 106th Regiment had fought at
Eniwetok.  While two battalions of the 105th Regiment and one battalion of the
106th had not been battle tested during World War II, about two-thirds of the
division had battle experience, since some of the organized artillery,
engineers, and service units had been at Makin.

     Major General Ralph C. Smith, an officer of the regular Army since 1917,
had commanded the 27th Infantry Division commencing 20 November 1942.
According to a history of the 27th Division during World War II, "He . . .
was considered the outstanding expert on the French Army and language.

     Major General Ralph C. Smith had been aboard the flagship Pennsylvania in
November 1943, rubbing elbows with his operational senior, Commander Northern
Landing Force (Turner), when General Smith was Commander Northern Landing
Troops, and conducting the ground operations at Makin in the Gilbert Islands.
Major General H. M. Smith, USMC, also was aboard the Pennsylvania at the same
time, being the Corps Commander of the Fifth Amphibious Corps and Commander
Expeditionary Troops.  Not only at Makin, but during the Eniwetok phase of the
Marshall Island operations, units of the 27th Infantry Division had been
attached to the Fifth Amphibious Corps and under the operational control and
consequent observation of Commander, Fifth Amphibious Corps (H. M. Smith).

     As a result of dissatisfaction with the way that the Commanding General,
27th Division was fighting his troops on Saipan, the Commander Fifth Fleet, on
24 June 1944, upon recommendation of Commander Expeditionary Force (Turner)
and of Commander Expeditionary Troops (H. M. Smith),

Authorized and directed the relief of Major General Ralph Smith as Commanding
General, 27th Division in order that the offensive on Saipan may proceed in
accordance with the plans and orders of the Commander Northern Troops and
Landing Force.

     Major General Sanderford Jarman, USA, the prospective Island Commander,
Saipan, relieved Major General Ralph C. Smith forthwith.

Smith vs Smith

     When I asked Admiral Turner in 1960 if he had any documents or opinions
to contribute to the controversy arising because Lieutenant General Holland M.
Smith, USMC, recommended the relief of his subordinate, Major General Ralph
Smith, AUS, he replied in length:

I have a Smith vs Smith file which I will give you.  Besides copies of some
letters and some clippings it has a half dozen despatches which I thought were
important and so kept a copy of them.  You may not find them readily
available.

Admiral Nimitz was very much upset by the incident when it happened and a lot
more upset after the war when it was dragged out in the Infantry Journal and
The Saturday Evening Post and rehashed all over again.  During the War,
Admiral Nimitz tried to sweep the matter under the rug in order to keep the
controversy from causing any lessening of the 110% cooperation between the
Services which he urged at all times, and by and large got.

I supported his action then, and still support it.

There are a couple of things about the controversy that you may not now know:

First:  Before we went into the Marshalls, 'Nervous Nellie' Richardson
(Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., USA) (Commanding General, Army
Forces, Central Pacific Area) gave Admiral Nimitz an 'eyes only' memorandum,
[for eyes of Admiral Nimitz alone] in which he recommended that the Fifth
Amphibious Corps Headquarters [Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC] be
limited to administrative duties and that when a future amphibious operation
arrived necessitating employment of a corps, that both the Corps Headquarters
and the Corps Troops be furnished by the Army.  News of that unhappy proposal
was soon floating around Pearl Harbor and raising the hackles of every Marine
in the Fifth Corps.

Second:  After Eniwetok, Harry Hill told me that he was far from happy about
the performance of the colonel commanding the 106th Regiment of the 27th
Division that had fought there.  I had had a few unhappy thoughts of my own
about that part of the 27th Division which was at Makin.  But I told Harry
Hill we would just have to learn how the Army fought and support them as best
we could.

You will also note, if you read the record carefully, that Colonel Ayers
[Russell G.] who commanded the 106th Infantry Regiment at Eniwetok Atoll and
again on landing at Saipan was relieved of his command after a couple of days
by the Army General [Jarman] who stepped into Ralph Smith's shoes.

One thing I would like to have appear in the record is that when a draft of
the Army's history of the Marianas Campaign was made available to me and I
read carefully that part of it dealing with the 27th Infantry Division's
fighting on the 22nd and 23rd of June, and the chapter on Smith versus Smith,
I was very much pleased to find the former quite factual and temperate.
Without saying that I agreed with every word in every sentence, I thought the
account of the troubles of the 27th Division which led to Ralph Smith's relief
well balanced.

However, I could not agree at all with the statement made in a later chapter
in discussing the 'Smith versus Smith' controversy that Ray Spruance and I
'jumped into the fight.'  To the best of my knowledge Ray Spruance never
jumped into any fight during the whole Pacific War, and I think everyone who
fought the war with him and knew him will agree.  Only someone who didn't know
Ray Spruance and didn't know what really happened would say or write that.
That's . . . a lie.

I was invited on many occasions after the war to express opinions for
publication in regard to this 'Smith versus Smith' matter.  I avoided them
like the plague.  That's still my policy.

I hope you will find somewhere a despatch which was sent out by me at Saipan
saying that no correspondents' stories which compared the fighting merits of
Marines and Army troops to the disadvantage of the Army would be released by
me.

     A paraphrased version of that despatch reads in part:

Vice Admiral Turner has directed that no stories will be released which
emphasize the merits of Marines or naval personnel against the Army personnel
. . . .

     Just for the record, the punch paragraph of the "eyes only" letter of
Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr. U.S. Army, which sought to deny
Major General H. M. Smith, USMC, operational command of the Fifth Corps troops
is quoted:

It is recommended that:

a.  The responsibilities assigned to the headquarters of the Fifth Amphibious
Corps be restricted to administrative duties in connection with USMC troops in
the Central Pacific Area.

b.  When the time arrives for the employment of a tactical corps as such in
the Central Pacific Area, both the Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, combat
and service, be furnished by the Army.

     As far as this writer could tell, the only thing about the Saipan
controversy, which was still capable of raising Admiral Turner's blood
pressure in 1960, was Admiral Nimitz's disregard of the letter originated by
Vice Admiral Turner and titled:  "Reporting unwarranted assumption of command
authority by Lieutenant General R. C. Richardson, Jr., USA."

     When I asked Fleet Admiral Nimitz about this Smith vs Smith controversy,
and about the "eyes only" letter he would not permit me to quote him, although
he had plenty to say vigorously off the record.  I can say that he did direct
my attention to a history of 27th Infantry Division and to the part which
read:

On 1 June (1942) an old friend of the Division arrived on Oahu to assure
command of the Hawaiian Department.  He was Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson,
Jr., who had commanded VII Corps during the Louisiana-Arkansas maneuvers.
During 1942, while on an inspection tour of the Pacific for General Marshall,
he had gone out of his way to pay a visit to the Division on Hawaii.

     One could infer from this that Fleet Admiral Nimitz believed that
Lieutenant General Richardson was more influenced by old friendships than by
the facts, when acting in this controversy.

     Perhaps Admiral Turner had the Smith versus Smith controversy in the back
of his mind when, after the war, he spoke as follows:

I learned a tremendous amount during World War II - about strategy and tactics
and about naval doctrine.  I also learned a lot about the technique of
warfare, and particularly the technique of naval amphibious warfare.

                  *         *         *         *         *

We found the most important technique of amphibious warfare to be the
willingness and ability to cooperate in spite of differences of opinion or
viewpoint between individuals, between branches in each Service and between
the different Services themselves, including Allied Services.  Many different
types of tactical elements are involved in amphibious operations.  Each type
has its own particular use.  If they are any good, the men of all those
elements believe they are the particular group who will most contribute to
success.  Their opinions and efforts must always be considered and
appreciated.  Conflicts between the different elements (which are inevitable)
must be adjusted in order to produce a smooth working team.

Saipan or Guam First?

     It should be mentioned that during the early planning period of Forager,
the campaign for the Marianas, there was much sentimental pressure for the
recapture of Guam prior to the assault on Saipan.  However, the very cogent
military reason that kept our planners' eyes on target was that if we attacked
Saipan first, Japanese reinforcement aircraft, flying out of the homeland or
Iwo Jima and down the Marianas chain, would not have the benefit of nearby air
bases to land and refuel before or after undertaking battle with our
protective air cover.  Knowing how temporary putting an airstrip "out of
commission" had proven to be, and how fast the Japanese Soldier was with a
shovel, it seemed most desirable not to permit the Japanese to use the
airstrips on Saipan, even intermittently, to interfere with the large task
force essential to recapture Guam.

Recovery of American Territory

     Vice Admiral Turner spent only three days at Guam during the twenty days
of the assault landing operation required for the reconquest.  While these
were the vital first three days, it is obvious that he left the amphibious
operation largely to Commander Southern Attack Force (TF 53), Rear Admiral
Conolly, in whom he had great confidence.  So only the planning aspects
pertaining to the exact day when the assault would be launched, in which Vice
Admiral Turner participated, and the general features of the assault landing
will be covered.

Planning the Guam Assault

     Most of the detailed planning for the landing operations of the
amphibious assault on Guam was done at Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands by
Rear Admiral R. L. Conolly, Commander Group Three, Fifth Amphibious Force, and
by Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Commanding General, Third Amphibious
Corps.  The Marine Third Division commanded by Major General Alan Turnage,
USMC, and the First Provisional Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Lemuel
C. Shepherd, USMC, both assigned to the Guam operation, and making up the
Third Amphibious Corps, were on Guadalcanal.  The assigned attack transports
and lesser amphibious craft were at Hollandia, a thousand miles to the
westward where they were working for General MacArthur until the last of
April, and the majority did not arrive back in the Solomons until about 10 May
1944.  This was only three weeks before the sailing dates for Task Force 53
necessarily occurring between the I st and 4th of June.  The Appalachian
(AGC-1), the only amphibious command ship other than the Rocky Mount currently
available in the Pacific, flew Rear Admiral Conolly's flag after her arrival
in the area from Pearl Harbor on 27 April 1944.

     The rehearsals were held 23-27 May in the
Tetere-Tassafaronga-Cape Esperance area of Guadalcanal.  After its departure,
the task force staged through Kwajalein and Roi in the Marshalls enroute to
Guam.

     Beginning about 16 June 1944, it was obvious that the Guam assault could
not be launched until the Japanese Fleet was beaten off and was out of the
Philippine Sea.  It was ten days after the initial Saipan landings before the
Japanese Fleet had exhausted itself, was in retreat, and the continuance of
the Forager Operation seemed secure.  Until about this same date, 25 June, the
doughty Japanese on Saipan had put up such a dogged and, in many ways,
skillful defense that both Commander Expeditionary Force and Commander
Expeditionary Troops easily agreed that there was a real chance that some of
the assault troops for Guam might have to be used on Saipan.  So the assault
troops for Guam remained afloat and within supporting distance of Saipan.

     After the Commander Expeditionary Troops was willing to release part of
the Guam assault troops from standby duty at Saipan, Commander Fifth Fleet and
his more senior Expeditionary Force officers, conditioned by the rugged
Japanese defense on Saipan, decided to wait to launch the assault on Guam
until the 77th Infantry Division arrived in the Marianas so as to have a
higher ratio of assault troops to Japanese defenders.  This decision was
reached despite an expressed desire and willingness of Rear Admiral Conolly
and Major General Geiger to make the assault prior to this date.

     On 25 June, the Northern Attack Group for Guam (TG 53.1) with the Marine
Third Division embarked was told off to return to Eniwetok.  The Southern
Attack Group for Guam (TG 53.2) with the 1st Provisional Brigade embarked
remained off Saipan as a Floating Reserve for another week.

     On 3 July 1944, Admiral Spruance held a conference of his senior
subordinates to try to determine a realistic date for the assault landing on
Guam.  The date chosen was 25 July.

     When Admiral King saw the despatch setting forth the decision and the
reasons therefore, he wrote "too late" just above the date.  CINCPAC also
found the date unacceptable, and the matter was argued out with Commander
Fifth Fleet by despatch.  In view of these high level negative reactions to 25
July as William Day, the day for the assault landing on Guam, a compromise
date of 21 July was advanced by Admiral Spruance.  This date stood despite
considerable reluctance on the part of Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz.  The
reason that 21 July was acceptable was because the last two Regimental Combat
Teams of the 77th Infantry Division out loaded from Hawaii could not possibly
arrive at Guam before that day.  Actually, they arrived on 22 July.

     On 6 July, final approval for a William Day of 21 July was received from
CINCPAC.  As a by-product soon thereafter, the Palau Islands operation in the
Carolines, which had a lien on some of the command resources of Amphibious
Group Three, - the assault landing force for Guam, -  was set for 15 September
1944.

Guam

     The month-long delay in launching the assault held the possibility of
creating a number of problems for the amphibians.  One of the more worrisome
was that July was the month when typhoons were something more than a
possibility in the area of the Marianas.  Another worry was how well the newly
put together crews of the smaller amphibious ships and the on-edge Marines
crowded aboard them, would stand up under the long continued suspense and the
monotony.

     Postponing the assault on Guam from the 18th of June to the 21st of July
had its drawbacks, but it also had its great advantages.  More troops were
available for the initial assault, and much, much more time was available for
the destruction of Japanese fixed defenses by both gun and air bombardment.
Besides all this:

A defense plan of Guam dated 25 March was captured on Saipan.  This plan
contains valuable data on the defenses of that island.

     Vice Admiral Turner reported that 37,292 Marines and 19,245 Army troops
participated in the assault on Guam.  This was about 80 percent as large as
the assault force on Saipan.  With over 56,000 troops, our assault forces at
Guam outnumbered the 18,500 Japanese troops by just better than a 3-to-1
ratio, while on Saipan the ratio had been only somewhat better than 2 1/
2-to-1.  Consequently, the Guam operation proceeded more rapidly although the
island was three times as large as Saipan.  Guam was captured in 20 days
versus 24 days for Saipan.

Unanticipated Reinforcements

     While the records indicate that there were an adequate number of Marines
assigned to the Guam assault, the War Diary of the LST-227, underway since 31
May 1944, reveals an unplanned strengthening of the assault troops on 12 June.

Three Marine stowaways voluntarily gave themselves up, having stowed away in
Guadalcanal in order to be present at the invasion of Guam.

Japanese Troop Strength on Guam

     Way back on 17 May 1944, when Rear Admiral Conolly was publishing his
operation plan for the assault on Guam, the Japanese troops on that island
were estimated to number 6,900 to 9,300 of which from 2,000 to 2,600 were
believed to be construction personnel.  It was noted that:

During April and May the estimated total number of troops on Guam has
increased 40%, and it is significant that the increase has been entirely in
combat troops and aviation personnel.

     As indicated before, the Japanese actually had double the number of the
top figure of this intelligence estimate of troops, that is, about 18,500.

     Besides 18,500 troops, the Japanese on Guam had the benefit of the
presence of Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata, Commanding General, 31st Army,
as well as Lieutenant General Takeshi Takashima, who was Commanding General,
29th Division, the basic infantry unit assigned to the Guam defense.
Lieutenant General Obata who, as previously mentioned, commanded all Japanese
Army defense forces in the mandated islands and in the Bonins, had flown back
to the Marianas from the Palau Islands after the assault on Saipan had
started.  Unable to alight on Saipan, he chose Guam and died there.

     The Japanese defensive armament on Guam was not massiv , but there were
19 Japanese 20cm (8.0"), eight 15cm (5.9") and twenty-two 12.7cm (4.9") coast
defense guns and approximately 40 heavy and 96 medium anti-aircraft guns to
worry the invaders.

An Old Shipmate

     Ten days before the assault landings in Guam, a Saratoga shipmate of Vice
Admiral Turner's, Chief Radioman George R. Tweed, was picked up from a Guam
hideout by a destroyer, the McCall (DD-400) carrying out a shore bombardment
mission.  Tweed and four others had ridden away from Agana as the Japanese
came into the town in December 1941 and all hid in the bush country.  The
others were captured and killed but Tweed had survived on Guam all during the
Japanese occupation.  Vice Admiral Turner sent Tweed a warm welcome message.

The Physical Facts

     All of northern Guam is a high plateau, while southern Guam is rough
terrain with numerous low mountain peaks.  Guam's shore line has a few
good-sized coral beaches and many miles of high cliffs.

     In addition to the bedrock choice of adequate landing beaches,
consideration also had to be given to the barrier reef from 25 yards to 700
yards wide surrounding the greater part of the island.  This barrier reef
existed off shore from all the good landing beaches, including those chosen.

     The beaches selected - Asan to the north of Apra Harbor, and Agat across
Orote Peninsula to the south from Apra Harbor - were the best.  But the
Japanese naturally put in their heaviest fixed defenses and grouped their
troops to protect them against an assault.  The main Japanese defense line ran
from Point Amantes marking the north of Tumon Bay south to Point Facpi on the
west coast of Guam.

Monotony First

     For the amphibians, the worst part of the Guam assault was the waiting
for it.  Having staged through Kwajalein and Roi between 9 and 12 June, Task
Force 53, except for the bombardment groups, just circulated in the hot sun
for the next two to three weeks, while the Japanese Fleet was being defeated
in the Philippine Sea and while the battle for Saipan was being won.

     Any ship that did anything else but slither through the hot salt water
made a record of it.  For example:

On 12 June the SC-1326 hit a large fish with her sound projector, bending the
shaft, destroying the dome and starting hull leaks which were finally stopped
by the ship's force.  The sound dome was rendered completely inoperative.

     As one LST Group Commander logged it, upon arriving in Eniwetok the day
after the Fourth of July, 1944:

This trip which ended up in Eniwetok instead of Guam was probably one of the
longest endurance runs of a Tractor Group (LST's) with troops aboard and
otherwise combat loaded and without replenishment of supplies and fresh water,
on record.

                  *         *         *         *         *

During the 26-day period at sea (9 June to 5 July) material breakdowns,
although numerous, for the most part, were minor and of short duration . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

The days underway were very hot and filled with uncertainty, bogies, snoopers,
shadowers, one enemy torpedo plane attack on our group and one on adjacent
group, Group Three . . . .

     LST-278 noted in her War Diary that she had 456 personnel on board when
sailing from Eniwetok.  One hundred seventeen were in the ship's company.  To
make her particularly unhappy when enemy planes were around, she also had 100
drums of gasoline and 70 tons of assault ammunition, mostly stowed topside.

     While the Guam invasion force circled for days in the hot and sultry
approach area, there was an adequate ration of Japanese air attacks to make up
for an absence on the smaller amphibious ships of drone targets to improve
their gunnery.  One LST logged its experiences:

A fourth plane circled to the rear of the formation and came in low at about
fifty feet bearing about 175 degrees relative to the [LST] 227.  All the guns
that could bear opened at about 4000 yards.  Wisps of smoke appeared when
about 2000 yards distant on its wing and engine cowling.  The plane then
turned, all our guns still firing with hits observed, and flew toward the
starboard quarter of the LST formation and fell into the sea with an increase
of smoke and flames appearing . . . .  Other LST's were firing as well, so
that a dispute no doubt would develop as to who got the plane.

                  *         *         *         *         *

Observed the DD Stemble sink the LCI(G)-468 which was hit by an enemy plane
during yesterday's attack and badly disabled.

Daring the Japanese to Stop Us

     The month-long air and gun bombardments against Guam by and large were
concentrated on the primary Japanese defense zone on the western side of the
island between Tumon Bay and Point Facpi.  There could be no doubt by the
Japanese defenders, as to the general area of our assault landing.  This was
particularly so because, in addition to the bombardments, the underwater
demolition teams for days conducted gunfire-protected demolition operations to
clear the chosen beaches of natural and artificial obstacles to our landing
craft.

     As Rear Admiral Ainsworth, Commander Cruiser Division Nine, wrote:

We had tipped off our hand . . . .  Nothing short of an engraved diagram could
have told the enemy more clearly that our photographic reconnaissance had been
good, that we had pin-pointed the locations of his principal batteries and
installations, and that our probable intentions were to land just about where
we did.

     Captured Japanese documents indicated that this judgment was excellent,
since immediately after the shelling the Japanese commander radically changed
his defensive plan from a four sector defense designed to meet an assault on
Guam initiated from any beach area to a plan to repel an invasion launched
against the Agana Bay-Agat Beach area.

     Preliminary gun bombardments of Guam were carried out on 16, 27, and 30
June.  Beginning 8 July 1944, Guam received daily heavy air and gun
bombardments steadily increasing as additional air or gun bombardment units
arrived from the Saipan area.  Rear Admiral Conolly arrived at Guam on 14 July
and for the week prior to the landing personally coordinated the air and gun
bombardment, and supervised the clearing of the beaches.

Underwater Demolition Teams

     At the time of Forager the Underwater Demolition Teams work was divided
into two phases.  Phase I was the reconnaissance of the approaches to a beach
and the removal, insofar as practical, of all obstacles in the approaches.
Phase II was the post-assault work of blasting channels and constructing ramps
to the beaches.

     Prior to Saipan, the UDTs had been reorganized, expanded and well trained
for their dangerous but essential chores.  They effectively explored the ever
present barrier reefs guarding each landing beach in Forager and removed
obstacles.

     The following extracts from the Action Report of UDT Three detail their
work during a small part of Phase I at Guam:

17 July 1944

1945:  Started approach for night operations to remove antiboat obstacles on
landing beaches at Asan.  Orders were to remove obstacles close to shore
first.  Operation delayed due to grounding of LCI-348 on reef.  After attempts
to remove LCI, which was taken under heavy mortar fire by enemy, it was
decided to abandon it and crew was removed by UDT #3's, Boat No. 4.

                  *         *         *         *         *

18 July 1944

0100:  Delayed operations to remove obstacles started.  Platoons 1 and 3
failed to locate obstacles assigned them.  Platoons 2 and 4 removed 60
obstacles each from Blue, Red 2 and Green Beaches.  Mortar fire from DDs.
Result 120 obstacles removed; used 2400 pounds Tetrytol.

                  *         *         *         *         *

1400:  3 LCPRs sent to reef edge under heavy fire cover and smoke screen,
and launched 5 rubber boats.  150 obstacles removed, using 3000 pounds
Tetrytol.

The edge of the reef, contrary to what was indicated by aerial reconnaissance,
did not break off sharply, but had a gradual slope from 18" of water at edge
of reef to about 6' of water, 100 feet from edge of reef . . . .  The enemy
had placed obstacles in an almost continuous front along the reef.  These
obstacles were piles of coral rock inside a wire frame made of heavy wire
net . . . .  They were 3 to 5 feet in diameter, 3 to 4 feet high and 5 to 8
feet apart . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

21 July 1944.  [William Day]

0730: Dispatched all UDT Boats to respective beaches to guide LCM's and LCT's
with tanks ashore and over reef.

                  *         *         *         *         *

0925:  All tanks landed safely . . . .  The intensity and accuracy of fire
cover during the two days prior to W-Day were amazing, considering the fact
that while demolition personnel were working within 50 yards of the beach, the
beach itself was covered with fire from LCI's, destroyers, cruisers, and also
from bombing and strafing planes . . . .

The Assault Landings

     William Day, the day for the assault landings on Guam, was 21 July 1944.
How Hour, the time the first assault wave was to hit the beach, was 0830.  The
objectives were along an eight-mile stretch of the coast in the vicinity of
Apra Harbor which included the series of four villages of Asan, Piti, Sumay
and Agat.

     The Third Marine Division landed at Asan north of Apra Harbor.  The 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade landed at the Agat beaches south of Orote Peninsula
and three miles south of Apra Harbor.

     All assault waves were in amtracs.  The lead waves hit the beach on
schedule.  The initial assault waves on the southern beaches at Agat received
light mortar fire.  As the third and fourth waves landed at the northern Asan
beaches, enemy mortar fire commenced on the reef and beach areas.  As soon as
the troops were out of the amtracs at both beaches, the amtracs were used to
shuttle to the beaches logistic support brought to the outer edge of the
fringing reef by LCVP's since ordinary landing craft could not cross the
shallow reefs.  LCT's soon augmented the LCVP's and LVT's.  Once ashore both
assaults were met by the usual stubborn to fanatical Japanese defense.

     Unloading proceeded slowly at first on the northern beaches due to the
beaches being brought under intermittent fire from mortars and light
artillery.  But by July 24th, LST's were discharging logistic support directly
on to pontoon piers in both attack areas.

The Essential Corps Reserve

     Temporary Transport Division 38 which carried the 77th Infantry Division
to Guam was a hastily assembled division, put together at Pearl Harbor when
the emergency requirement arose for immediately moving the 77th Infantry
Division.  The experience of the Alshain (AKA-55), commissioned on 1 April
1944, was typical.  As reported in her ship history:

After a short period of fitting out, she proceeded to Chesapeake Bay for
shakedown and training and then to the Norfolk Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Va., for
post-shakedown availability.  She then . . . proceeded to Pearl Harbor,
reporting for duty to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, on May 19, 1944.

The ship was first assigned as an Amphibious Training Ship at San Diego, but
just before she reached the West Coast, she received orders to replenish fuel
and provisions and return to Pearl Harbor at best speed.  Upon her arrival at
Pearl Harbor, the Alshain was assigned to temporary Transport Division 38
(Captain J. B. Heffernan, USN, in USS Lamar, APA-47) and commenced loading
combat cargo of the 305th Regimental Combat Team of the 77th Infantry Division
for the forthcoming invasion of Guam.

     The Alpine (APA-92), another ship in the division, was not even
commissioned until 22 April 1944.  Nine weeks later she also was loading
troops for Guam.

     It was a minor miracle, in addition to indicating the soundness of the
basic amphibious manuals, that the ships of this division turned in such
satisfactory performances.

     Unloading of RCT-306 and RCT-307 of the 77th Infantry from the Transport
Group carrying the Corps Reserve took place on William Day plus two on the
White Beaches at Agat.  One report noted:

During this period, two regiments of infantry were landed by wading over the
reef; all the 77th Division Artillery were put ashore from LST's and
transports.  Headquarters and miscellaneous troops waded over the reef and
approximately 12,000 long tons of vehicles and cargo were unloaded over the
reef and placed ashore.

     Rubber boats and DUKWs had to be used for this unloading since no LVT's
were available to the ships landing the 77th until William plus seven.  Two
XAKs in the hodgepodge of ships used to ferry the 77th Infantry Division to
Guam did not even carry landing boats.

     The reefs off the beaches of Guam created problems for all the
amphibians.

Thus:

Generally speaking all cargo, except wheeled vehicles, had to be manhandled,
towed, floated, pushed, paddled or carried in amphibious vehicles (when
available) over 500 to 700 yards of reef to the beach . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

Beach parties could more properly be called reef parties in this operation
since the reef was where the beach parties were set up.  They worked from life
rafts, floats, in the water and generally all over the reef keeping things
moving . . . .  This was truly an amphibious operation, almost a submarine one
in fact.  Officers and men of these parties became 'water rats' and half
submerged stevedores.

The almost total lack of anchorage in the Agat area made it necessary to keep
the transports and merchant ships hove to during day within the antisubmarine
screen and to retire them at night by groups.  At times there were from 20 to
30 large ships concentrated in this Transport Area, the tactical control of
which was a daily problem, complicated by lack of adequate voice communication
facilities on the increasing number of merchant ships.

     Japanese counterattacks during the first week of the Guam assault were
strong.  During one on the Asan beaches as late as 26 July, infiltrators
reportedly reached the beach area.

     Advance in the northern sector by the Third Marine Division was slow.  In
the southern landing area, Orote Peninsula was captured on 29 July.  On the
31st, the push across to the east coast of Guam by the combined efforts of all
the troops commenced.  By 1 August, Port Pago on the east coast of Guam had
been reached, and by 9 August, Point Ritidian at the northern end of the
island was taken.

Dividends from Lying Low

     Beginning on 10 July, until after the first assault waves had beached on
21 July, the Japanese on Guam fired neither coast defense guns nor
anti-aircraft guns.  This permitted our air bombardment to be conducted far
more accurately, but it also led to a false sense of security by the smaller
amphibious ships.

     Some of the LST's recorded narroww escapes from Japanese gunfire long
after the first troops had gone ashore on 21 July:

After the first two shots which bracketed the LST-227, the enemy gunfire was
directed at the LST-481 on our starboard quarter.  Numerous hits were
observed.  The LST's 227 and 481 immediately made smoke and got underway
dragging anchor.  The LST-481 burning forward of the superstructure deck
passed close aboard and cut in front of the bow of the LST-227 . . . .

                  *         *         *         *         *

At 1639 retracted amid increasing enemy mortar fire and steamed out to
transport area, empty of cargo and greatly relieved after unloading a cargo of
gasoline and ammunition under intermittent enemy fire for three days, with no
hits scored.

     LST-267 reported:

This vessel designated to lay off beachhead and act as Hot Cargo Ship . . . .
Laying off beachhead at 2500 yards.  Ship numbers being illuminated, we drew
gunfire.  Hauled out 1000 yards and turned out landward lights.  Shells landed
from 10 to 75 yards from ship.

     The smaller amphibious craft drew considerable attention from the
Japanese artillery.  Three LCI(G)'s, two LST's and one SC were hit, with a
total of 15 killed and 50 wounded.

     In addition to concern over enemy gunfire, there were also worries over
poor holding ground off the beaches.  LST-227 noted:

During the entire time at Agat, great difficulty was experienced by the anchor
not holding on the hard coral bottom.

The Guam Beaches

     When it was all over, Guam's beaches (Aga and Asan) were judged to be
less suited for unloading than those at Saipan, primarily because:

1.  There were no natural passages through the fringing reef for use by
landing boats.

2.  The barrier reef was far distant from the beach (200 to 500 yards).

3.  The water over the barrier reef at Agat was too deep for trucks to be
launched there from landing craft and then keep moving to the beach under
their own power, even at low tide.

     Dadi Beach, located between Agat Beach and Orote Peninsula, was used for
unloading after Orote Peninsula was well in hand (28 July 1944), and the
danger from a flank assault removed.

The Battle Is Over

     Organized Japanese resistance was declared ended on Guam on 10 August
1944.  Vice Admiral Turner returned to Guam on 13 August, by which date Rear
Admiral Conolly had been relieved by Rear Admiral Reifsnider and departed for
his chores at Yap and Ulithi in the Palau operation.  At noon on 15 August,
two months after arriving at Saipan to initiate the assault landings of
Forager, Vice Admiral Turner in the Rocky Mount got underway for Pearl Harbor,
arriving there on 26 August 1944.

     In the next month after Vice Admiral Turner's departure from Guam, nearly
5,000 Japanese were rooted out of canyons and caves.  A few in scarce
incidents surrendered, but mostly they fought to the bitter end.  Between 15
September and 15 November 1944, the enemy still refusing to yield to fervent
pleas to surrender in the face of greatly superior force, another 1,600
Japanese committed suicide or had to be killed.

     As Admiral Nimitz wrote:

The enemy met the assault operations with pointless bravery, inhuman tenacity,
infiltration, cave fighting and the will to lose hard.

     Throughout the assault period and during the cleanup action, the gunboat
LCI's rendered yeoman service, not only shooting into caves and other hiding
places, but ferrying Marines from here to there as they sought out the
remainder Japanese.

The Weather Deteriorates

     Before the island had been secured, there was a period of uncertain
weather at Guam.  Vice Admiral Turner's report included this entry:

On July 30, as a result of a disturbance forming near Guam, and developing
rapidly to the west of Saipan, heavy swells from westerly directions built up,
lasting through August 4 . . . .

     During this period, 29 July through 4 August 1944, heavy weather made
unloading very difficult and at times brought it virtually to a standstill.

Naval Gunfire Support - Guam

     There were no complaints about the naval gunfire support at Guam.  Major
General Geiger, USMC, Commander Third Amphibious Corps, sent this fine message
to the Navy's gunners:

The capture of the island of Guam has ended the naval gunfire requirements of
the Landing Force.  I wish to express to you, your fire support unit
commanders, and the firing ships themselves my appreciation for continuous and
effective support rendered.  The enemy was never able to rally from the
initial bombardment and the continual gunfire support kept him in a state of
confusion to the end of the campaign.  Naval gunfire contributed largely in
keeping losses of the Landing Forces to a minimum and in bringing the Guam
Campaign to an early and successful close.  It is believed that this campaign
has set a new mark for the employment of the fire power of our ships and it is
hoped that in future operations of this force, naval gunfire may do as much
for us.

The positions where we landed were heavily fortified with everything except
beach and reef mines.  Our naval gunfire and air bombardments were so
effective that scarcely a shot was fired at our first four LVT waves until
after they were on the beach.  At least half of the total amount of fixed
defenses were destroyed, and more than that in the vicinity of the landing.
Probably 80% of the troops defending the beach either were killed or retreated
to other positions.

     Two personal letters from Vice Admiral Turner during Forager touched on
naval gunfire support.  The first referred particularly to Saipan and the
second to Forager as a whole.

The demands of the troops for support by naval gunfire after the landing had
been successful, have been far greater than we expected.  Fortunately, the
reserve supplies have been adequate, but we must raise our sights on this
item . . . .

We all feel that naval gunnery and air gunnery improved considerably during
this operation.